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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

Wisconsin courts admit evidence of acquiescence in the truth of direct
accusations by silence, and follow the majority rule in permitting this evidence
even though the accused was under arrest when the inculpatory statement was
made. Hardy v. State, 150 Wis. 176 136 N.W. 638 (1912); Manna v. State, 179
Wis. 384, 192 N.W. 160 (1922); McCormick v. State, supra.
WILLIAM J.

SLOAN.

Domestic Relations-Marrage--Annulment for Fraud.-Plaintiff sought an
annulment of her marriage on the ground of fraud alleging that the defendant
obtained her consent by falsely representing that he was a naturalized American
citizen when in fact he was a citizen of Germany. The court granted the annulment under the New York doctrine which holds that any misrepresentation is
sufficient to justify an annulment if it is so material that the deceived party
would not have consented to the marriage except for such misrepresentatiofi.
It was stated that the plaintiff's insistence that her spouse be an American citizen could not be regarded as the expression of a frivolous desire in view of the
present-day emphasis on the privilege of American citizenship and the plaintiff's
pride in the fact that her family was of American origin. Laage v. Laage, 9
U.S. L. WE-K 2642 (N.Y. 1941).
This problem was discussed, but not decided in Kawbata v. Kawabata, 48
N.D. 1160, 189 N.W. 237 (1922), (1923) 2 Wis. L. REv. 117. A minority of the
court stated that a man's misrepresentation that he is a citizen of the United
States would seem to justify an annulment of his marriage to a United States
citizen whose citizenship in America is affected by marriage to a foreigner.
The extent to which some courts, led by New York in DiLorenzo v. Di
Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903), had relaxed the older and more strict
views as to the degree or kind of fraud which would be sufficient to annul the
marriage contract was indicated in 23 MARQ. L. REv. 147, noting Nocenti v.
Ruberti, 3 AtI. (2d) 128 (N.J. 1939), where an annulment was granted because
the man misrepresented that he would marry the plaintiff according to the rites
of the Roman Catholic Church within a year after their marriage by a civil
ceremony.
More recently the broad New York rule has been applied to annul a marriage
where the bridegroom stated immediately following the ceremony that he
believed the marriage to have been mistakenly performed and then, within
fifteen minutes after leaving the justice of the peace, departed from his bride
and was not heard from again. The court said that fraud sufficient to annul
any civil contract will justify the annulment of a marriage, especially where the
marriage has not been consummated "and has not ripened fully into the complications of a public status involving considerations of questions of public policy."
Lewine v. Lewine, 170 Misc. 120, 9 N.Y. S. (2d) 869 (1938).
Although mere sterility is not sufficient to justify an annulment, a New York
court has annulled for fraud a marriage where the husband had failed to
disclose a physical infirmity which made him sterile even though he had not
known of his sterility at the time of the marriage. Because of the known
infirmity he was held to have been put on inquiry which, if pursued by a physical
examination, would have disclosed the sterility. Since he knew his prospective
wife wanted a family, his concealment of the known infirmity was held to be a
fraud sufficient to annul the marriage which but for the concealment would
not have been contracted. Williams v. Williams, 11 N.Y. S. (2d) 611 (1939).
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RECENT DECISIONS

But New York recently refused an annulment to a petitioner who alleged
that the defendant had fraudulently promised to love and cherish him, but after
the marriage had failed to do so, holding that a mere change of mind is not
sufficient to justify an annulment. The petition also had alleged a fraudulent
representation by the defendant tha: she desired a family, but that after the
marriage she had taken measures to prevent the conception of more than two
children. This was not a sufficient allegation of fraud, the court held, in the
absence of a further allegation that the defendant had misrepresented her
intent at the time of expressing her wish. Longtlin v. Longtin, 22 N.Y.S.
(2d) 827 (1940).
Annulments have been granted for fraud where a citizen of a foreign country
married a citizen of the United States only for the purpose of gaining preferential entry into America under the immigration laws. Bracksmayer v. Bracksmayer,
22 N.Y.S. (2d) 110 (1940); Miodownik v. Miodownik, 259 App. Div. 851,
19 N.Y.S. (2d) 175 (1940); reargument denied, 20 N.Y.S. (2d) 670 (1940);
Lederkremer v. Lederkreiner, 173 Misc. 587, 18 N.Y.S. (2d) 725 (1940).
But an annulment will be denied where the fraud has been condoned by the
plaintiff's acts of continuing the marital relationship after he has discovered
the defendant's fraud. Morris v. Morris, 13 AtI. (2d) 603 (Del. 1940) ; Wirth v.
Wirth, 23 N.Y.S. (2d) 289 (1941).
Pin.n' W. GRossM, JR.

Torts-Bailments-Presumption and Burden of Proof as to Negligence of
Bailee.-Plaintiff stored certain automobiles in the garage owned by defendants.
While so stored and while the defendants' employees were on duty, the automobiles were stolen. In an action to recover damages for the loss, based on
negligence, it was held, that when the bailor has proved the bailment and the
damage or loss, the bailee then has the burden of showing that the damage or
loss was not due to his negligence, and that he stands the risk of non-persuasion
on the point. Rowney v. Covey Garage, 9 U. S. L. Week 2626, 111 P. (2d) 545
(Utah 1941).
Most jurisdictions apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in situations like
that of the principal case. These courts hold that when the bailor shows the fact
of the bailment, and that the goods were not returned or were returned in a
damaged condition, he has made out a prima facie case, and the bailee must come
forward and rebut the presumption of negligence that arises. However, there is
a marked difference of opinion as to how much proof is necessary to rebut this
presumption.
In some jurisdictions a small amount of proof is held sufficient. Thus where
the plaintiff showed that his automobile had been stolen while in the parking
lot of the defendant, it was held that although a prima fade case in favor of
the plaintiff arises upon proof of delivery of and failure to return the bailed
property, it disappears on a showing by either the bailor or bailee that the loss
was caused by fire or theft, and the plaintiff must then prove that the theft
was due to the defendant's negligence. Edwards Hotel Co. v. Terry, 185 Miss.
824, 187 So. 518 (1939). In a similar case, where the plaintiff's horses were burned
to death while in the exclusive possession of the defendants under a bailment
contract, the court said that a presumption of negligence arises when the bailed
property is destroyed while in the defendant's exclusive possession, but that this
presumption is overcome by a showing that the loss occurred through the operation of forces not within the bailee's control, and that the plaintiff then has the

